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The problem of detention 
The challenges that Europe faces with regard to 
controlling irregular migration and providing 
protection to people in need are complex. An 
effective policy for irregular migration control 
includes arrest and return (through voluntary, 
semi-voluntary or indeed forced return) and it 
may seem to be best served by regular detention 
of apprehended undocumented immigrants and 
asylum seekers whose case is pending. At the 
same time, if this policy is to be in line with 
international obligations and the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights it must provide 
for adequate services and safeguards so that 
those apprehended are informed of their rights 
including the possibility to apply for asylum, and 
are not routinely detained.  
Detention should be an extreme measure used 
only when there is a fear that the person will 
abscond and in view of an imminent expulsion, 
or when there is a well-founded fear that the 
person will commit a crime. However, detention 
is currently used in Greece (and in many other 
European countries) as a punishment for having 
crossed a border illegally or even for having filed 
an asylum application; without due examination 
of the specific personal and family circumstances 
of the irregular migrant or asylum seeker, their 
probability to commit crimes, neither the harm 
that detention will do to them and to the minors 
often accompanying them.  
Detention has been a hotly debated issue in 
Greece. The country was heavily criticized for its 
detention facilities on the islands1, particularly 
in Lesvos. It has also been criticized for 
detaining asylum seekers2, a practice which in 
2012 not only continued but also was 
strengthened, through the modification of the 
Presidential Decree 114/2010 that enables the 
detention of asylum seekers for 12 months 
(rather than 3 and under special circumstances 6 
months in place until then).  
Greece imposes by law the maximum time for 
detention, which is 18 months (prescribed in the 
Return Directive, under exceptional 
circumstances only) for both irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers.  The policy of detention was 
conceived however not only as a punitive 
measure and/or as deterrence to future arrivals; 
it was originally conceived as an effective way to 
curb indiscriminate lodging of asylum claims, as 
means of legalising one’s stay.  In relation to the 
latter, recent findings3 show that migrants are 
                                                 
1 For the situation at Greek detention centres see 
ProAsyl (2007), Human Rights Watch (2008), Frontex 
(September 2011). 
2 See UNHCR (18 October 2012) ‘Η κράτηση των 
αιτούντων άσυλο δεν πρέπει να αποτελεί 
γενικευμένη πρακτική αλλά εξαιρετικό μέτρο’ 
(‘Detention of asylum seekers should not be the 
norm but the exception’), URL: 
http://www.unhcr.gr/nea/artikel/b007e6faf3f8f128
db0b7075b5aafe33/ypati-armosteia-i-k.html, 
9/2/2013 in Greek. 
3 See interviews with migrants in detention 
facilities, October-December 2013, in the 
framework of the IRMA project  
(http://irma.eliamep.gr/).  
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indeed discouraged from applying, since they are 
informed that detention time starts once more 
from zero, once they apply for asylum and until a 
final decision is reached on their application. 
Deterrence is not a standalone policy. In fact, it 
is complimented by return and increasingly 
linked with “voluntary” return, procedure 
initiated during detention often with the 
assistance of IOM, whereby the migrant is 
presented with the alternative to “go home” or 
remain in detention while his/her asylum claim is 
processed or travel documents are issued for 
removal. Because voluntary return means the 
migrant cooperates and embassies tend to also 
be more cooperative (when the individual wishes 
to return), it is also a more expedient process; 
however it has raised criticism as to what an 
extent it is “voluntary” and how “sustainable” is 
the return (or whether the migrant re-migrates 
upon return).  
As Claire de Senarclens argues4 immigration 
detention is usually thought of as a way to 
facilitate the removal of illegally staying foreign 
nationals. However it is useful to distinguish 
between administrative detention, mainly 
aiming at guaranteeing that the individual is 
present when it comes to the execution of their 
removal, and the disciplinary function of 
detention, when it is thought of as an 
instrument of coercion for forcing people to 
cooperate for the purpose of their own removal. 
Indeed the distinction may be subtle but is real.  
There is a third type of detention: detention as 
sanction for having crossed the border 
unauthorized and/or for seeking asylum. This 
punishment dimension is used by governments to 
deter prospective irregular migrants from 
entering their territory or asylum seekers from 
applying for international protection. The latter 
is related to the view that applying for asylum 
actually stalls the removal procedure until the 
application is processed (which in countries like 
Greece for instance may take several years). 
                                                 
4 See Forced Migration Review, fall 2013, Issue 44, 
page 60. 
There is a common agreement among scholars 
and NGOs that using detention in its disciplinary 
and punishment dimension is increasingly 
common in European countries. Relevant studies 
and NGO experiences documented in Forced 
Migration Review (fall 2013) note that there is a 
pressing need for assessing the costs (both direct 
in terms of lodging and policing detained people, 
and indirect in terms of the damage inflicted to 
these people whose only crime is to have crossed 
the country’s borders unauthorized and/or 
having applied for asylum) of detention. 
In addition, the costs of detention need to be 
examined more closely. Recent studies5 have 
shown that Italy is spending a minimum of 55 
million Euros per year for the functioning of its 
CIE centres (Centres for Identification and 
Expulsion). In the period between 1998 and 2012 
nearly 170,000 individuals have been “hosted” at 
CIE but only 46.2% of them have been effectively 
removed from the Italian territory. In addition 
the Italian government has invested in the period 
2005-2012 a total sum of 1.668 billion Euros (of 
which 1.3 billion contributed by the Italian state 
and 281.3 million from EU funds) with a dubious 
success in limiting the phenomenon of irregular 
migration. In addition the studies show that 
there is a lack of transparency on how policies 
are implemented and how money is spent. There 
is a lack of evaluation and assessment of the 
activities conducted and the expenses sustained. 
In addition under the current Spending Review, 
the funds available for the CIE have been 
reduced further jeopardising the quality of life 
and the respect of the basic human rights of 
people detained there. 
 
The Greek authorities have so far failed to 
consider let alone implement alternative 
measures such as community integration of 
asylum seeking or irregular migrants awaiting 
                                                 
5 For more details see http://www.lunaria.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/SINTESI_COSTIDISUMANI_
def.pdf and http://www.wiss-
lab.dirpolis.sssup.it/files/2013/06/Libro-dirpolis-
ita.pdf  
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proceedings.  Such community integration 
schemes at their more restrictive version can 
involve house arrest and electronic surveillance 
with daily or weekly reporting requirements 
and/or curfews which are still better than 
custodial detention. Instead, in early 2014, 
Greek authorities have reinforced the use of 
detention against both irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers. 
 
Extending detention indefinitely in order to 
force migrants to co-operate on return 
On 24 February 2014, the Greek Legal Council 
published Advisory Opinion no 44/2014, in which 
it held that it was legal for the Greek authorities 
to detain irregular migrants beyond eighteen (18) 
months – the maximum time allowed under 
Greek law – and prolong their detention 
indefinitely, until the latter consent to return to 
their home countries. The Opinion had been 
initiated by a police query concerning the fate of 
300 migrants out of a total number of 7,500 
detainees, who were about to be released as 
their removal had not been carried out in time. 
According to the Council such a measure was 
justified by the need to prevent “a rapid 
increase in the number of irregular migrants in 
the country and its undesirable consequences in 
public order and safety” that the timely release 
of the 300 migrants as well as any future ones 
would “with certainty” cause. This would also 
serve the best interests of irregular migrants, 
“who are vulnerable people” and destitute, but 
can enjoy a dignified living inside the detention 
centre.6 Even though Advisory Opinions are not 
binding, the police authorities accepted it 
unconditionally and are already issuing decisions 
that inform detainees about this newest 
development. At the same time, Greece has 
undertaken a significant financial investment in 
                                                 
6 See Greek Council of State, Advisory Opinion No 
44/2014, published on 24 February 2014, pp. 
22-23.  
detention centres7.  
The idea behind this latest course of action by 
the Greek authorities is rather straightforward: 
faced with the prospect of indefinite stay inside 
a Greek detention centre – often under 
deplorable conditions – irregular migrants will 
opt to return to their homelands. Once there, 
they will warn others and discourage new 
arrivals. The size of the migrant population will 
gradually shrink and Greece will have largely 
addressed irregular arrivals. Yet the systematic 
use of any detention, let alone an indefinite one, 
cannot live long as a policy tool to manage the 
irregular migrant population in Greece, because 
it is – to put it rather simply – in violation of 
existing obligations. 
 
Why is the indefinite detention of irregular 
migrants not legal? 
1). According to EU Directive 2008/115/EC 
('Returns Directive') which Greece has 
transposed, Member States may place in 
detention a migrant awaiting deportation in 
order to carry out his deportation or prepare his 
return to his home country, in limited cases and 
if less coercive measures are not sufficient. 
Given the exceptional nature of such a harsh 
measure, the Directive sets a maximum 
detention time of six (6) months. In exceptional 
circumstances detention may be extended for 
another twelve (12) months.8  Thus, the total 
length of time that the Greek authorities may 
detain an irregular migrant for the purpose of 
removal is eighteen (18) months9. When asked by 
                                                 
7 For the 2014 calls search under “Expenses” 
approved by the Ministry for the Protection of the 
Citizen at http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr . 
8 See Directive 2008/115/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 
on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_fr
eedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylu
m_immigration/jl0014_en.htm, Article 15.  
9  See Article 30-32 Law Νo. 3907/2011 and Article 
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the Bulgarian authorities whether it was allowed 
under EU law to extend detention beyond 
eighteen (18) months in the case of migrants who 
hamper their own removal process, the Court of 
Justice replied that “It must be pointed out 
that, [...] Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115 in 
no case authorises the maximum period defined 
in that provision to be exceeded.” Detaining a 
person on grounds of “public order and public 
safety [...] that he is not in possession of valid 
documents, his conduct is aggressive, and he has 
no means of supporting himself and no 
accommodation or means” cannot constitute 
grounds for allowing detention to be extended 
beyond eighteen (18) months10. Since the time 
limit set by the EU Directive is both clear and 
unambiguous, leaving no space for Members 
States to differentiate11, the Greek authorities 
will be violating the Directive if they do not 
immediately release migrants upon the expiry of 
eighteen (18) months.  
2) The systematic use of detention as such, let 
alone an indefinite one as the police authorities 
seek to enforce, is also unlawful because it 
violates a number of international and European 
legal obligations. As mentioned earlier, both the 
EU Directive and Greek law clearly state that 
detention of irregular migrants for the purpose 
of removal is a measure of last resort, the use of 
which must be limited and can only be 
maintained as long as removal arrangements are 
in progress and executed with due diligence12. To 
be justified, there must be a real prospect that 
the removal can be carried out. Asylum seekers, 
for instance, cannot be detained on grounds that 
they have entered or reside in the country 
illegally13. The blanket application of detention 
                                                                           
76 Law No. 3386/2005 as amended.  
10 See Court of Justice of the European 
Union(Grand Chamber), Case C-357/09 PPU, Said 
Shamilovich Kadzoev  (Huchbarov) v. Directorate 
for Migration at the Ministry of the Interior, 
Judgment of 30 November 2009,  par. 68-71. 
11  Ibid. paras 37, 54 and 61. 
12 See Returns Directive, Article 15. 
13 See also Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 
December 2005 on minimum standards on 
towards all migrants and its automatic extension 
beyond eighteen (18) months finds therefore no 
basis under Greek and EU law also for this 
reason. 
3. Next to EU and Greek law, Greece is also 
bound by its obligations under the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). In order for 
the detention of irregular migrants to be 
“lawful” under Article 5 par 1(f) the Convention, 
the European Court of Human Rights, which 
issues binding judgments for the State Parties to 
the Convention, has developed certain principles 
that must be met: detention must be 
implemented in good faith, the place and 
conditions of detention must be appropriate, the 
duration of the detention reasonable and the 
authorities must process the deportation within a 
timely manner. Greece has already been 
repeatedly convicted for failing to meet these 
principles and for arbitrarily locking up migrants 
under deplorable conditions in violation of the 
Convention – even in cases where the detention 
had only lasted a few weeks14.  
In line with the Court's standards, in a recent 
judgment a Greek court acquitted from all 
charges 15 irregular migrants who had escaped 
from a detention centre, on grounds that the 
facility did not meet international standards. 
This by itself rendered the duration and 
conditions of their detention unlawful15. 
                                                                           
procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2005.326.01.00
13.01.ENG; see also Article. 12, presidential decree 
113/2013. 
14 See ECtHR, S.D. v. Greece, Appl. No 53541/07, 
Judgment of 11 September 2009; A.A. v. Greece, 
Appl. no. 12186/08, Judgment of 22 July 2010; 
Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, Judgment of 
26 November 2009; Rahimi v. Greece, Appl. No. 
8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011. 
15 See Misdemeanour Court of Igoumenitsa, 
Decision No 682/2012 of 2 October 2012, available 
at 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BzLLCPJMrNIEbnF
DZUdaR3VoTHM/edit . 
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For the latest measure to successfully pass the 
Convention test, first the detention conditions 
must improve and be brought in line with 
international standards. This by itself would 
require significant financial investment – way 
beyond the current budget. Even then, however, 
Greece would still be in violation of the 
Convention, because it would fail to meet the 
rest of the requirements that the Court has set. 
Greece therefore will be acting in violation also 
on this ground. 
 
Assessing the Cost and the Benefits 
Even though Greece has an undeniable sovereign 
right to control the number of aliens who enter 
and stay in its territory, it is also subject to its 
obligations under national, European and 
international law. Policy choices that are in 
violation of those obligations are not beneficial, 
because once their arbitrariness is judicially 
established their financial and political costs are 
higher than any initial short-term benefits.  
Until four years ago, migrants could be detained 
for the purpose of removal for up to three (3) 
months, while more specific provisions limited 
the use of detention to particular circumstances 
where deportation was feasible16. In practice 
however, police authorities systematically 
detained all arrested migrants and exceeded the 
time-limit, by issuing consecutively more than 
one deportation decisions for the same migrant, 
each one of which set into motion a separate 
deportation and detention procedure. This 
meant that a migrant who had just been released 
because his removal was not feasible, could be 
arrested on his/her way out of the detention 
facility, served with a new deportation decision 
and led back inside to serve another three 
months – sometimes within less than one hour. 
The arbitrariness of this practice was criticised 
by the Greek Ombudsman for seeking to 
                                                 
16 See law No 2910/2001, Art. 44 par. 3; see also 
Law No 3772/2009 Art. 48 that entered into force 
on 8 July 2009 raising the limit to 6 months. 
“regularise” a detention that would otherwise 
find no support under the Greek law17. Thus, 
Greece's very recent past in using detention as a 
main policy tool and trying to exceed the legal 
time-limits is a lesson to avoid, especially since 
there is little evidence that the previous policy 
discouraged migrants from entering the 
country18. On the other hand, its illegality added 
substantial political and financial costs for 
Greece.  
The first conviction by the European Court of 
Human Rights led Greece to pay a symbolic sum 
of 5000 euros to the victim19. Four more 
convictions led to a total of 48,000 euros in 
compensations,20 while more applications kept 
on arriving. In terms of political costs, Greece 
was the first State to be publicly condemned by 
the Committee for the Prevention of Torture for 
the ways it treated irregular migrants21 and was 
obliged to put an end to this migration control 
policy under the watchful eye of the Council of 
Europe22. Limited funds and absence of adequate 
                                                 
17 See Greek Ombudsman, «Πόρισμα: Διαδοχικές 
Αποφάσεις Απέλασης», September 2006, available 
at 
http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/_porisma_apel
asi_21_01.pdf . 
18 For arrests in the period 2006- 2013 see 
http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories//2014/st
atistics14/allod2014/statistics_all_2014_01_all&dia
_apo2006.JPG . 
19 See ECtHR, John v. Greece, Appl. No 199/05, 
Decision of 10 May 2007. 
20 See ECtHR, S.D. v. Greece, Appl. No 53541/07, 
Judgment of 11 September 2009; A.A. v. Greece, 
Appl. no. 12186/08, Judgment of 22 July 2010; 
Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, Judgment of 
26 November 2009; Rahimi v. Greece, Appl. No. 
8687/08, Judgment of 5 April 2011. 
21 See Council of Europe Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, “Public Statement concerning Greece”, 
15 March 2011, available at 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2011-10-
inf-eng.htm   
22 See Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers 
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 
December 2012 at the 1157th Meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies, “Resolution 
CM/ResDH(2012)183, Mohd and John 
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facilities, combined with indefinite detention 
resulted in Greece being the first State towards 
which returns under the Dublin II Regulation 
were suspended. In particular, the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece23 challenged the 
presumption of safety and of a level playing field 
in asylum processing within the EU, with the 
Court arguing against the idea that there is  ‘per 
se a sufficient basis for intra-EU transfers of 
asylum seekers’. It found that the dysfunctions 
of the Greek asylum system and the inhuman and 
degrading conditions of detention in the country 
violated articles 3 and 13 of the European 
Convention for Human Rights and deprived 
asylum seekers from their right to an effective 
remedy. This resulted, for the first time since 
the implementation of the Dublin II Regulation, 
in a suspension of transfers of asylum-seekers 
from other member states towards Greece. The 
broader implications of this decision were 
evident soon enough; Greece was pressured to 
dramatically overhaul its asylum system, 
reception conditions and broader practices in 
dealing with irregular migrants, a process that 
continues to this day. 
Given the profound arbitrariness of the latest 
policy measure, its short viability in terms of 
legality, the doubtfulness of its outcome, the big 
financial investment involved and the political 
risks of any new convictions, it is beyond doubt 
that this is not an effective and sustainable 
policy for Greece to manage its irregular migrant 
population. 
 
Recommendations  
1. Greece must explore its alternatives 
before resorting to a measure that 
entails huge financial and political risks 
                                                                           
against Greece,  Execution of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights”,  available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-116545 . 
23 ECtHR (GC), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. 
No. 30696/09, 21 Jan. 2011. 
and cannot bring the desired outcomes, 
even by the mere fact that it cannot 
survive legally for long.  
2. Greece can invest in setting higher 
incentives for migrants to return to their 
home countries and pursue a closer co-
operation with the International 
Organisation for Migration that carries 
out voluntary return programmes. 
3. The authorities can reduce the overall 
financial costs of their policy framework 
by assessing on a more individualised 
basis the status of irregular migrants in 
particular of those that are currently in 
detention, by taking into account that: 
 In view of the recent crisis, many 
migrants who have lived in Greece 
legally for over ten years lost their 
residence permits over the past 
months. The authorities should seek 
to regularise their stay, in particular 
since many of these people have 
developed ties with the country that 
would entitle them to a residence 
status. 
 Asylum seekers and other persons 
whose removal is not feasible must 
not be held in detention for as long 
as their removal cannot be carried 
out. 
 
Supplementary measures can also include 
 Surveillance schemes alternative to 
detention. Pilot schemes have been tried 
in Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom but also Australia and 
the USA24. While state authorities have 
been often reluctant to adopt such 
schemes, the overall assessment is 
positive.  
                                                 
24 Forced Migration Review, fall 2013, Issue no. 44, 
pages 40-62. 
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 Avoid detention from the start, 
particularly when minors and families 
are involved. 
 Screen and assess individual cases, 
presuming that detention is used in 
exceptional circumstances.  
 Provide legal counselling and regularly 
updated information on the progress of 
their case.  
 Offer social and psychological support to 
adults and families. 
 Enroll children to school. 
 Supervise regularly especially when the 
time comes when removal is imminent 
but seek to resort to detention only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
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